Intuitive consequences of the Revision Theory of Truth

Analysis 62 (4):330-336 (2002)
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Michael Kremer
University of Chicago

Citations of this work

On Artifacts and Truth-Preservation.Shawn Standefer - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Logic 12 (3):135-158.
How to find an attractive solution to the liar paradox.Mark Pinder - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1661-1680.
The rationale behind revision-rule semantics.Lionel Shapiro - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 129 (3):477 - 515.

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