Smoke without fire: What do virtual experiments in cognitive science really tell us?

Abstract
Many activities in Cognitive Science involve complex computer models and simulations of both theoretical and real entities. Artificial Intelligence and the study of artificial neural nets in particular, are seen as major contributors in the quest for understanding the human mind. Computational models serve as objects of experimentation, and results from these virtual experiments are tacitly included in the framework of empirical science. Simulations of cognitive functions, like learning to speak, or discovering syntactical structures in language, are the basis for many claims about human capacities in language acquisition. This raises the question whether results obtained from experiments that are essentially performed on data structures are equivalent to results from "real" experiments. This paper examines some design methodologies for models of cognitive functions using artificial neural nets. The process of conducting the cognitive simulations is largely a projection of theories, or even unsubstantiated conjectures, onto simulated neural structures and an interpretation of the experimental results in terms of the human brain. The problem with this process is that results from virtual experiments are taken to refer unambiguously to the human brain; and the more the language of human cognitive function is deployed in both theory construction and (virtual) experimental interpretation, the more convincing the impression. Additionally, the complexity of the methodologies, principles, and visualization techniques, in the implementation of the computational model, masks the lack of actual similarities between model and real world phenomena. Some computational models involving artificial neural nets have had some success, even commercially, but there are indications that the results from virtual experiments have little value in explaining cognitive functions. The problem seems to be in relating computational, or mathematical, entities to real world objects, like neurons and brains. I argue that the role of Artificial Intelligence as a contributor to the knowledge base of Cognitive Science is diminished as a consequence.
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