A hesitant defense of introspection

Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1165-1176 (2013)
Abstract
Consider the following argument: when a phenomenon P is observable, any legitimate understanding of P must take account of observations of P; some mental phenomena—certain conscious experiences—are introspectively observable; so, any legitimate understanding of the mind must take account of introspective observations of conscious experiences. This paper offers a (preliminary and partial) defense of this line of thought. Much of the paper focuses on a specific challenge to it, which I call Schwitzgebel’s Challenge: the claim that introspection is so untrustworthy that its indispensability for a genuine understanding of the mind only shows that no genuine understanding of the mind is possible
Keywords Introspection  Phenomenology  Cognitive science  Context of discovery  Context of justification
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-013-0148-0
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References found in this work BETA
The Sources of Intentionality.Uriah Kriegel - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
The Phenomenology of Virtue.Julia Annas - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):21-34.

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Citations of this work BETA
Reply to Kriegel, Smithies, and Spener.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1195-1206.

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