Backwards Causation, Time, and the Open Future

Metaphysica 9 (2):173-191 (2008)
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Abstract

Here are some intuitions we have about the nature of space and time. There is something fundamentally different about the past, present, and future. What is definitive of the past is that the past events are fixed. What is definitive of the future is that future events are not fixed. What is definitive of the present is that it marks the objective ontological border between the past and the future and, by doing so, instantiates a particularly salient phenomenological property of nowness. Call the combination of these intuitions according to which there exists an objective present, a fixed past, and an open future, the intuitive view. I argue that, given the intuitive view, the possibility of backwards causation—and hence, for instance, backwards time travel—is problematic

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Kristie Miller
University of Sydney

References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
Time, Tense, and Causation.Michael Tooley - 1997 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Presentism and properties.John Bigelow - 1996 - Philosophical Perspectives 10:35-52.

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