Brentano's Mature Theory of Intentionality

Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 4 (2):1-15 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX


The notion of intentionality is what Franz Brentano is best known for. But disagreements and misunderstandings still surround his account of its nature. In this paper, I argue that Brentano’s mature account of the nature of intentionality construes it, not as a two-place relation between a subject and an object, nor as a three-place relation between a subject’s act, its object, and a ‘content,’ but as an altogether non-relational, intrinsic property of subjects. I will argue that the view is more defensible than might initially appear


Added to PP

3,019 (#2,547)

6 months
365 (#6,149)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Uriah Kriegel
Rice University

Citations of this work

Intentionality as intentional inexistence.Laura Gow - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (8):1371-1385.
Das intentionale Objekt als Unding.Carlo Ierna - 2023 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 100 (1-2):113-130.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

On Denoting.Bertrand Russell - 1905 - Mind 14 (56):479-493.
The Language of Thought.J. A. Fodor - 1978 - Critica 10 (28):140-143.
Perception: A Representative Theory.Frank Jackson - 1977 - Cambridge University Press.
On referring.Peter F. Strawson - 1950 - Mind 59 (235):320-344.

View all 19 references / Add more references