Consciousness as intransitive self-consciousness: Two views and an argument

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (1):103-132 (2003)
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Abstract

The word ?consciousness? is notoriously ambiguous. This is mainly because it is not a term of art, but a mundane word we all use quite frequently, for different purposes and in different everyday contexts. In this paper, I discuss consciousness in one specific sense of the word. To avoid the ambiguities, I introduce a term of art ? intransitive self-consciousness ? and suggest that this form of self-consciousness is an essential component of the folk notion of consciousness. I then argue for a specific account of consciousness as intransitive self-consciousness. According to this account, a mental state is conscious iff it represents its own occurrence. The argument is a ?modernizing? modification of an older argument due to Aristotle and Brentano

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Uriah Kriegel
Rice University

Citations of this work

For-me-ness: What it is and what it is not.Dan Zahavi & Uriah Kriegel - 2015 - In D. Dahlstrom, A. Elpidorou & W. Hopp (eds.), Philosophy of Mind and Phenomenology. Routledge. pp. 36-53.
Intentional inexistence and phenomenal intentionality.Uriah Kriegel - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):307-340.
Sensorimotor subjectivity and the enactive approach to experience.Evan Thompson - 2005 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (4):407-427.
Is intentionality dependent upon consciousness?Uriah Kriegel - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 116 (3):271-307.

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References found in this work

Facing up to the problem of consciousness.David Chalmers - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):200-19.
Two concepts of consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 49 (May):329-59.
Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1995 - Philosophy 72 (279):150-154.
A Materialist Theory of the Mind. [REVIEW]Alvin I. Goldman - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (22):812-818.

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