Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (1):1-26 (2003)
When a mental state is conscious â in the sense that there is something it is like for the subject to have it â it instantiates a certain property F in virtue of which it is a conscious state. It is customary to suppose that F is the property of having sensory quality. The paper argues that this supposition is false. The first part of the paper discusses reasons for thinking that unconscious mental states can have a sensory quality, for example in cases of absent-minded perception. If unconscious mental states can have a sensory quality, then sensory quality is an insufficient condition for consciousness. The second part of the paper argues that there are even better reasons to think that sensory quality is an unnecessary condition for consciousness. The idea is that mental states can be conscious even when they lack sensory quality, for example, in the case of certain conscious propositional attitudes. In the third part of the paper, an alternative to the rejected supposition, drawn from the phenomenological tradition, is offered: that consciousness is a matter of implicit self-awareness, rather than of sensory quality. According to this alternative, a mental state is conscious when, and only when, it involves implicit self-awareness
|Keywords||Consciousness Metaphysics Perception Qualia Self-awareness|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Phenomenal Epistemology: What is Consciousness That We May Know It so Well?Terry Horgan & Uriah Kriegel - 2007 - Philosophical Issues 17 (1):123-144.
Sensorimotor Subjectivity and the Enactive Approach to Experience.Evan Thompson - 2005 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (4):407-427.
Naturalizing Subjective Character.Uriah Kriegel - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):23-57.
Consciousness, Agents and the Knowledge Game.Luciano Floridi - 2005 - Minds and Machines 15 (3):415-444.
Moral Phenomenology: Foundational Issues.Uriah Kriegel - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):1-19.
Similar books and articles
Caging the Beast: A Theory of Sensory Consciousness.Paula Droege - 2003 - John Benjamins.
Pre-Requisites for Conscious Awareness: Clues From Electrophysiological and Behavioral Studies of Unilateral Neglect Patients.L. Deouell - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):546-567.
Self-Awareness and Mental Perception.Hisayasu Kobayashi - 2010 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 38 (3):233-245.
A Critique of Dretske's Conception of State Consciousness.A. Minh Nguyen - 2001 - Journal of Philosophical Research 26 (January):187-206.
Sensory States, Consciousness, and the Cartesian Assumption.Gregg Caruso - 2005 - In Nathan Smith and Jason Taylor (ed.), Descartes and Cartesianism. Cambridge Scholars Press.
Perception, Cognition, and Consciousness in Classical Hindu Psychology.K. Ramakrishna Rao - 2005 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (3):3-30.
Phenomenal Character as Implicit Self-Awareness.Greg Janzen - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (12):44-73.
A Theory of Consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1997 - In Ned Block, Owen J. Flanagan & Guven Guzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness. MIT Press.
The Independence of Consciousness and Sensory Quality.David M. Rosenthal - 1991 - Philosophical Issues 1:15-36.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads114 ( #42,692 of 2,163,870 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #62,637 of 2,163,870 )
How can I increase my downloads?