Consciousness and self-consciousness

The Monist 87 (2):182-205 (2004)
Authors
Uriah Kriegel
Institut Jean Nicod
Abstract
In recent philosophy of mind, it is often assumed that consciousness and self-consciousness are two separate phenomena. In this paper, I argue that this is not quite right. The argument proceeds in two phases. First, I draw a distinction between (i) being self-conscious of a thought that p and (ii) self-consciously thinking that p. I call the former transitive self-consciousness and the latter intransitive self-consciousness. I then argue that consciousness does depend on intransitive self-consciousness, and that the common reasons for denying the dependence of consciousness upon self-consciousness apply only to transitive self-consciousness
Keywords Consciousness  Intransitivity  Metaphysics  Self-consciousness  Transitivity
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ISBN(s) 0026-9662
DOI 10.5840/monist20048725
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Why Are We Certain That We Exist?Alexandre Billon - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (3):723-759.
Self-Representationalism and Phenomenology.Uriah Kriegel - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (3):357-381.
The Phenomenologically Manifest.Uriah Kriegel - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):115-136.

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