Philosophy East and West 69:144-156 (2019)

Uriah Kriegel
Rice University
Contemporary theories of consciousness can be divided along several major fault lines, but one of the most prominent concerns the question of whether they accept the principle that a mental state's being conscious involves essentially its subject being aware of it. Call this the awareness principle: For any mental state M of a subject S, M is conscious only if S is aware of M. Although analytic philosophers divide sharply on whether to accept the principle, the philosophy-of-mind literature appears to contain mainly arguments against it, rather than for it. One reason is that those who accept the principle often find themselves in a certain dialectical...
Keywords Dignāga  consciousness  reflexivity theories  memory
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DOI 10.1353/pew.2019.0003
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References found in this work BETA

Conscious Experience.Fred Dretske - 1993 - Mind 102 (406):263-283.
The Intentionality of Memory.Jordi Fernández - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):39-57.
Self-Intimation, Memory and Personal Identity.Jonardon Ganeri - 1999 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 27 (5):469-483.

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Citations of this work BETA

Minimal Phenomenal Experience.Thomas Metzinger - 2020 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (I):1-44.

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