Intentional inexistence and phenomenal intentionality

Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):307-340 (2007)
Abstract
How come we can represent Bigfoot even though Bigfoot does not exist, given that representing something involves bearing a relation to it and we cannot bear relations to what does not exist?This is the problem of intentional inexistence. This paper develops a two-step solution to this problem, involving an adverbial account of conscious representation, or phenomenal inten- tionality, and the thesis that all representation derives from conscious representation. The solution is correspondingly two-part: we can consciously represent Bigfoot because consciously representing Bigfoot does not involve bearing a relation to Bigfoot, but rather instantiating a certain non-relational property of representing Bigfoot-wise; and we can non-consciously represent Bigfoot because non-consciously representing Bigfoot does not involve bearing a relation to Bigfoot, but rather bearing a relation to conscious representations of Bigfoot
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1520-8583.2007.00129.x
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Word and Object.W. V. Quine - 1960 - MIT Press.
The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.
What is It Like to Be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.

View all 38 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Not in the Mood for Intentionalism.Davide Bordini - 2017 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 41 (1):60-81.
There Are Intentionalia of Which It Is True That Such Objects Do Not Exist.Alberto Voltolini - 2013 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (3):394-414.
Intentionality and Normativity.Uriah Kriegel - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):185-208.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
407 ( #6,304 of 2,193,222 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
25 ( #6,735 of 2,193,222 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature