Intrinsic theory and the content of inner awareness
Journal of Mind and Behavior 24 (2):169-196 (2003)
Consciosuness is the property mental-occurrence instances have when the subject has immediate awareness of them. According to intrinsic theory, this immediate awareness is intrinsic to the conscious4 mental-occurrence instance, whereas according to appendage theory, it forms a separate mental-occurrence instance. Assuming, rather than arguing for, the correctness of intrinsic theory, this paper investigates a number of theses about the specific intentional content of the immediate awareness built into conscious4 mental-occurrence instances. These theses are mostly drawn from work conducted within the framework of appendage theory, especially by David Rosenthal. After transposing them into the conceptual framework of intrinsic theory, we discuss the merits of each of these theses.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Visual Awareness of Properties.Matthew Kennedy - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):298–325.
Appendage Theory -- Pro and Con.Thomas Natsoulas - 1992 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 13 (4):371-96.
The Case for Intrinsic Theory IX . Further Discussion of an Equivocal Remembrance Account.Thomas Natsoulas - 2004 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 25 (1):7-32.
The Case for Intrinsic Theory: II. An Examination of a Conception of Consciousness 'Subscript 4' as Intrinsic, Necessary, and Concomitant.Thomas Natsoulas - 1996 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 17 (4):369-390.
Consciousness, Higher-Order Content, and the Individuation of Vehicles.Uriah Kriegel - 2003 - Synthese 134 (3):477-504.
The Case for Intrinsic Theory XI: A Disagreement Regarding the Kind of Feature Inner Awareness Is.Thomas Natsoulas - 2004 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 25 (3):187-211.
The Case for Intrinsic Theory: III. Intrinsic Inner Awareness and the Problem of Straightforward Objectivation.Thomas Natsoulas - 1998 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 19 (1):1-19.
The Case for Intrinsic Theory IV: An Argument From How Conscious Mental-Occurrence Instances Seem.Thomas Natsoulas - 1999 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 20 (3):257-276.
What is Wrong with the Appendage Theory of Consciousness?Thomas Natsoulas - 1993 - Philosophical Psychology 6 (2):137-54.
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
Added to index2009-01-28
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?