In D. Rose (ed.), Experimental Metaphysics. New York: Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 7-46 (2017)

Authors
Uriah Kriegel
Rice University
Abstract
What is the rationale for the methodological innovations of experimental philosophy? This paper starts from the contention that common answers to this question are implausible. It then develops a framework within which experimental philosophy fulfills a specific function in an otherwise traditionalist picture of philosophical inquiry. The framework rests on two principal ideas. The first is Frank Jackson’s claim that conceptual analysis is unavoidable in ‘serious metaphysics’. The second is that the psychological structure of concepts is extremely intricate, much more so than early practitioners of conceptual analysis had realized. This intricacy has implications for the activity of analyzing concepts: while the central, coarser, more prominent contours of a concept may be identified from the armchair, the finer details of the concept’s structure require experimental methods to detect.
Keywords serious metaphysics  conceptual analysis  experimental philosophy  Ramsey sentences
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References found in this work BETA

Constructing the World.David Chalmers - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
Knowing Full Well.Ernest Sosa - 2010 - Princeton University Press.
The Meaning of 'Meaning'.Hilary Putnam - 1975 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:131-193.

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Citations of this work BETA

Cognitive Science for the Revisionary Metaphysician.David Rose - forthcoming - In Alvin Goldman & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.), Cognitive Science and Metaphysics. Oxford University Press.

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