Personal-level representation

Protosociology 28:77-114 (2012)
Uriah Kriegel
Institut Jean Nicod
The current orthodoxy on mental representation can be characterized in terms of three central ideas. The -rst is ontological, the second semantic, and the third methodological. The ontological tenet is that mental representation is a two-place relation holding between a representing state and a represented entity (object, event, state of a.airs). The semantic tenet is that the relation in question is probably information-theoretic at heart, perhaps augmented teleologically, functionally, or teleo-functionally to cope with di/cult cases. The methodological tenet is that mental representations are posited solely on third-person explanatory grounds. In this paper, I argue that this picture of mental representation is satisfactory only as an account of mental representation at the sub-personal level. It is unsatisfactory, in a principled way, as an account of mental representation at the personal level.
Keywords representation  sub-personal  awareness  first-person perspective
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The Uses and Abuses of the Personal/Subpersonal Distinction.Zoe Drayson - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):1-18.
Varieties of Inference?Anna‐Sara Malmgren - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):221-254.
Pictures, Plants, and Propositions.Alex Morgan - forthcoming - Minds and Machines:1-21.

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