PANIC theory and the prospects for a representational theory of phenomenal consciousness

Philosophical Psychology 15 (1):55-64 (2002)
Authors
Uriah Kriegel
Institut Jean Nicod
Abstract
Michael Tye has recently argued that the phenomenal character of conscious experiences is "one and the same as" (1) Poised (2) Abstract (3) Non-conceptual (4) Intentional Content (PANIC). Tye argues extensively that PANIC Theory accounts for differences in phenomenal character in representational terms. But another task of a theory of phenomenal consciousness is to account for the difference between those mental states that have phenomenal character at all and those that do not. By going through each of the four qualifiers of PANIC, we argue that PANIC Theory fails to account for this difference in genuinely representational terms. We suggest, furthermore, that the reasons it fails are likely to be endemic to all representational theories of phenomenal consciousness
Keywords Consciousness  Content  Experience  Metaphysics  Psychology  Representation  Tye, M
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DOI 10.1080/09515080120109414
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The Psychology of Folk Psychology.A. Goldman - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):15-28.

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Citations of this work BETA

Representationalism About Consciousness.William E. Seager & David Bourget - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. pp. 261-276.
Reductive Representationalism and Emotional Phenomenology.Uriah Kriegel - 2017 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 41 (1):41-59.
Naturalizing Subjective Character.Uriah Kriegel - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):23-57.

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