Philosophical Studies 143 (3):357-381 (2009)

Authors
Uriah Kriegel
Rice University
Abstract
To a first approximation, self-representationalism is the view that a mental state M is phenomenally conscious just in case M represents itself in the appropriate way. Proponents of self-representationalism seem to think that the phenomenology of ordinary conscious experience is on their side, but opponents seem to think the opposite. In this paper, I consider the phenomenological merits and demerits of self-representationalism. I argue that there is phenomenological evidence in favor of self-representationalism, and rather more confidently, that there is no phenomenological evidence against self-representationalism
Keywords Consciousness  Self-representationalism  Peripheral inner awareness  Phenomenology  The transparency of experience  Subjective character
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-008-9204-6
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References found in this work BETA

On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness.Bernard J. Baars - 1988 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Myth of Phenomenological Overflow.Richard Brown - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):599-604.
A Simple Theory of Introspection.Declan Smithies - 2012 - In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
Phenomenal Consciousness with Infallible Self-Representation.Chad Kidd - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (3):361-383.

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