Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory

Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK (2009)
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Abstract

Some mental events are conscious, some are unconscious. What is the difference between the two? Uriah Kriegel offers an answer. His aim is a comprehensive theory of the features that all and only conscious mental events have. The key idea is that consciousness arises when self-awareness and world-awareness are integrated in the right way. Conscious mental events differ from unconscious ones in that, whatever else they may represent, they always also represent themselves, and do so in a very specific way. Subjective Consciousness is a fascinating new move forward towards a full understanding of the mind.

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Uriah Kriegel
Rice University

Citations of this work

A Theory of Sense-Data.Andrew Y. Lee - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.
Minimal phenomenal experience.Thomas Metzinger - 2020 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (I):1-44.
Acquaintance.Matt Duncan - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (3):e12727.
The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program.Uriah Kriegel - 2013 - In Phenomenal Intentionality. , US: Oxford University Press. pp. 1–26.

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