The Intentional Structure of Moods

Philosophers' Imprint 19:1-19 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Moods are sometimes claimed to constitute an exception to the rule that mental phenomena are intentional (in the sense of representing something). In reaction, some philosophers have argued that moods are in fact intentional, but exhibit a special and unusual kind of intentionality: they represent the world as a whole, or everything indiscriminately, rather than some more specific object(s). In this paper, I present a problem for extant versions of this idea, then propose a revision that solves the problem but also entrains an important change in our understanding of the nature of moods – and indeed of the nature of mind. What emerges is an intentionalist account that emphasizes the role of attitude rather than content in determining the character of moods.



External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Affect without object: moods and objectless emotions.Carolyn Price - 2006 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 2 (1):49-68.
Moods and situations.Francisco Gallegos - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
Pure Intentionalism About Moods and Emotions.Angela Mendelovici - 2013 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind. New York, New York: Routledge. pp. 135-157.
Not in the Mood for Intentionalism.Davide Bordini - 2017 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 41 (1):60-81.
Intentionalism about Moods.Angela Mendelovici - 2018 - Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy 57:89-97.
Intentionalism about Moods.Angela Mendelovici - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):126-136.
The intentionality and intelligibility of moods.Jonathan Mitchell - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):118-135.
A Theory of Moods and Their Place in Our Science of Mind.Laura Patricia Sizer - 2000 - Dissertation, The University of Wisconsin - Madison


Added to PP

532 (#38,163)

6 months
33 (#121,277)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Uriah Kriegel
Rice University

Citations of this work

Emotion.Charlie Kurth - 2022 - New York, NY: Routledge.
Moods: From Diffusivness to Dispositionality.Alex Grzankowski & Mark Textor - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
A perceptual theory of moods.Mauro Rossi - 2019 - Synthese 198 (8):7119-7147.
What is Inner Awareness?Uriah Kriegel - forthcoming - In Davide Bordini, Arnaud Dewalque & Anna Giustina (eds.), Consciousness and Inner Awareness. Cambridge University Press.
Feeling as Consciousness of Value.Ingrid Vendrell Ferran - 2022 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 25 (1):71-88.

View all 18 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references