Journal of the History of Philosophy 52 (1):162-163 (2014)

Mary Katrina Krizan
University of Wisconsin-La Crosse
In The Powers of Aristotle’s Soul, Thomas Kjeller Johansen offers a fresh treatment of Aristotle’s De Anima, showing that Aristotle can successfully explain the cause of life and activities of living things by appealing to a minimal number of definitionally independent capacities, in much the way that a faculty psychologist would. Johansen situates Aristotle’s account of the soul within the framework of his natural philosophy, arguing that the definitional independence of the soul’s capacities does not conflict with the internal unity of the soul. In doing so, he offers explanations of the further abilities and capacities of the soul, including phantasia and locomotion.In the first eight chapters of the book ..
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DOI 10.1353/hph.2014.0006
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