Uriah Kriegel
Rice University
An increasing number of epistemologists defend the notion that some perceptual experiences can immediately justify some beliefs and do so in virtue of (some of) their phenomenal properties. But this view, which we may call phenomenal dogmatism, is also the target of various objections. Here I want to consider an objection that may be put as follows: What is so special about perceptual phenomenology that only it can immediately justify beliefs, while other kinds of phenomenology – including quite similar ones – remain ‘epistemically inert’? I will argue that to overcome this objection, the phenomenal dogmatist should incorporate into her view a general principle – I call it the ‘experiential attitude/doxastic content link’ principle – that essentially extends the view from the perceptual case to other phenomenal states.
Keywords dogmatism  perceptual phenomenology  immediate justification  content/attitude distinction
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References found in this work BETA

The Skeptic and the Dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.
Skepticism and the Veil of Perception.Michael Huemer - 2001 - Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism.Michael Huemer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):30–55.
An Essay on Belief and Acceptance.L. Jonathan Cohen - 1992 - New York: Clarendon Press.
The Varieties of Consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2015 - Oxford University Press.

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