Temporally Token-Reflexive Experiences

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (4):585-617 (2009)
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John Searle has argued that all perceptual experiences are token-reflexive, in the sense that they are constituents of their own veridicality conditions. Many philosophers have found the kind of token-reflexivity he attributes to experiences, which I will call _causal_ token-reflexivity, unfaithful to perceptual phenomenology. In this paper, I develop an argument for a different sort of token-reflexivity in perceptual (as well as some non- perceptual) experiences, which I will call _temporal_ token-reflexivity, and which ought to be phenomenologically unobjectionable



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Uriah Kriegel
Rice University

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Philosophical explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

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