Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (4):585-617 (2009)

Authors
Uriah Kriegel
Rice University
Abstract
John Searle has argued that all perceptual experiences are token-reflexive, in the sense that they are constituents of their own veridicality conditions. Many philosophers have found the kind of token-reflexivity he attributes to experiences, which I will call _causal_ token-reflexivity, unfaithful to perceptual phenomenology. In this paper, I develop an argument for a different sort of token-reflexivity in perceptual (as well as some non- perceptual) experiences, which I will call _temporal_ token-reflexivity, and which ought to be phenomenologically unobjectionable
Keywords Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
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Reprint years 2009
ISBN(s) 0045-5091
DOI 10.1353/cjp.0.0064
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References found in this work BETA

The Principles of Psychology.William James - 1890 - London, England: Dover Publications.
Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.
Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Silence Perception and Spatial Content.Błażej Skrzypulec - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 1:1-15.

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