A new future similarity objection

Philosophical Studies 175 (6):1477-1493 (2018)
Authors
Thomas Kroedel
Universität Hamburg
Abstract
The future similarity objection against David Lewis’s theory of counterfactuals re-emerges once the space-time of possible worlds is adequately represented. Given such a representation, it can be shown that a number of counterfactuals that seem clearly true, such as Kit Fine’s example ‘If Nixon had pressed the button, there would have been a nuclear holocaust’, come out false, even if determinism is assumed. Lewis’s similarity criteria can be modified in different ways to avoid the problem, but some of the modifications have problems of their own.
Keywords Counterfactual conditionals  Possible worlds  Similarity  David Lewis
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-017-0921-6
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References found in this work BETA

Making Things Happen. A Theory of Causal Explanation.James Woodward - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):233-249.
Counterfactuals.D. Lewis - 1973 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 27 (4):403-405.
Most Counterfactuals Are False.Alan Hájek - 2014 - Http://Philrsss.Anu.Edu.Au/People-Defaults/Alanh/Papers/Mcf.Pdf, Accessed June 12, 2014.

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