A simple argument for downward causation

Synthese 192 (3):841-858 (2015)
Authors
Thomas Kroedel
Universität Hamburg
Abstract
Instances of many supervenient properties have physical effects. In particular, instances of mental properties have physical effects if non-reductive physicalism is true. This follows by a straightforward argument that assumes a counterfactual criterion for causation. The paper presents that argument and discusses several issues that arise from it. In particular, the paper addresses the worry that the argument shows too many supervenient property-instances to have physical effects. The argument is also compared to a similar argument that has been suggested by Lei Zhong and is shown to be superior to the latter
Keywords Counterfactual conditionals  Downward causation  Mental causation  Non-reductive physicalism  Supervenience
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s11229-014-0600-5
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 38,077
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Physicalism, or Something Near Enough.Jaegwon Kim - 2005 - Princeton University Press.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 431-433.
Causation.David Lewis - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (17):556-567.

View all 29 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Causal Exclusion Argument.Jesper Kallestrup - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (2):459-85.
Emerging From the Causal Drain.Richard Corry - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (1):29-47.
Can Counterfactuals Solve the Exclusion Problem?Lei Zhong - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):129-147.
Emergence and Causal Powers.Graham Macdonald - 2007 - Erkenntnis 67 (2):239 - 253.
How Causal is Downward Causation?Menno Hulswit - 2005 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 36 (2):261 - 287.
The Nonreductivist's Trouble with Mental Causation.Jaegwon Kim - 1992 - In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.
Mental Causation as Multiple Causation.Thomas Kroedel - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (1):125-143.
Mental Causation as Teleological Causation.Andrew J. Jaeger - 2011 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 85:161-171.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2014-11-22

Total views
98 ( #69,054 of 2,313,328 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #156,398 of 2,313,328 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature