Philosophical Psychology 18 (1):31-43 (2005)
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Blindsight is the ability of patients with an impaired visual cortex to perform visually in their blind field without acknowledging that performance. This ability has been interpreted as a sign of the absence of phenomenal consciousness, and neuroscientific studies have extensively studied cases of it. Different proposals separate visual form recognition from motion perception, and attempt to show that either the former or the latter is solely responsible for blindsight performance. However, a review of current experimental evidence shows that a poor performance (on both form and motion) is accompanied by poor awareness. Blindsight cases do not influence the qualia debate, because they denote a severe visual performance deficit, and not because of a purportedly non-phenomenal nature of consciousness.



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Consciousness and Criterion: On Block's Case for Unconscious Seeing.Ian Phillips - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (2):419-451.

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References found in this work

Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
A Materialist Theory of the Mind.D. M. Armstrong - 1968 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Ted Honderich.
On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.

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