David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Studies 67 (2):151 - 167 (1992)
Two notions of evidence are focused on in this essay, Carnap's positive-relevance notion of evidence (1962, pp. 462 ff.), and Achinstein's notion of potential evidence (1978; and 1983, pp. 322–350). Achinstein creates several interesting examples in his attempt to find faults in Carnap's notion of evidence; his motive, ultimately, is to impel us towards potential evidence. The purpose of this essay is to show that positive relevance is significantly more promising than potential evidence with respect to capturing the scientific sense of the term evidence. This is accomplished by finding faults in the notion of potential evidence, and by defending positive relevance against Achinstein's examples.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Rudolf Carnap (1962). Logical Foundations of Probability. Chicago]University of Chicago Press.
Peter Achinstein (1983). The Nature of Explanation. Oxford University Press.
Carl G. Hempel (1945). Studies in the Logic of Confirmation (I.). Mind 54 (213):1-26.
Peter Achinstein (1978). Concepts of Evidence. Mind 87 (345):22-45.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Peter Achinstein (ed.) (1983). The Concept of Evidence. Oxford University Press.
Steven Gimbel (1999). Peirce Snatching: Towards a More Pragmatic View of Evidence. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 51 (2-3):207-231.
Steven Gimbel (2004). Restoring Ambiguity to Achinstein's Account of Evidence. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (2):269-285.
Kent W. Staley (2005). Agency and Objectivity in the Search for the Top Qjjark. In P. Achinstein (ed.), Scientific Evidence: Philosophical Theories & Applications. The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Branden Fitelson & Richard Feldman (2012). Evidence of Evidence is Not (Necessarily) Evidence. Analysis 72 (1):85-88.
Peter Achinstein (2001). The Book of Evidence. Oxford University Press.
Patrick Maher (1996). Subjective and Objective Confirmation. Philosophy of Science 63 (2):149-174.
P. Achinstein (ed.) (2005). Scientific Evidence: Philosophical Theories & Applications. The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Sherrilyn Roush (2004). Discussion Note: Positive Relevance Defended. Philosophy of Science 71 (1):110-116.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads36 ( #133,773 of 1,925,793 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #255,035 of 1,925,793 )
How can I increase my downloads?