Synthese 94 (3):377 - 408 (1993)
This paper provides a new solution to the epistemic paradox of belief-instability, a problem of rational choice which has recently received considerable attention (versions of the problem have been discussed by — among others — Tyler Burge, Earl Conee, and Roy Sorensen). The problem involves an ideally rational agent who has good reason to believe the truth of something of the form:[Ap] p if and only if it is not the case that I accept or believe p.
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References found in this work BETA
Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God.Alvin Plantinga & Nicholas Wolterstorff (eds.) - 1983 - University of Notre Dame Press.
Default Reasoning: Jumping to Conclusions and Knowing When to Think Twice.Kent Bach - 1984 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 65 (1):37.
Prisoners' Dilemma is a Newcomb Problem.David Lewis - 1979 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 8 (3):235-240.
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Higher-Order Evidence.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185-215.
The Suppositional Ramsey Test and Decision-Instability.Simone Duca - 2011 - Topoi (1):53-57.
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