Tri interpretácie Humovej teórie príčinnosti a problém falošných príčin

Ostium 11 (4) (2015)

This paper deals with Hume’s theory of causation and his two definitions of cause. Hume’s theory of causation is based on the notions of priority, contiguity, constant conjunction and necessary connexion. The first problem is whether, according to Hume, necessary connexion is a basic part of causation. As Beebee claims, there are three distinct interpretations of Hume’s theory. The traditional interpretation claims that, according to Hume, there are only regular successions of events and necessary connexion or powers are incoherent part of causation. According to projectivism, necessary connexion is an additional component that we project into the causation. Sceptical realism claims that Hume was a sceptic about knowing the real nature of powers but he believed that they exist in the external world. The second problem is whether projection or belief in necessary connexion is able to solve the problem of spurious causes. All three interpretations claim that we cannot know anything about powers or necessary connexion of events. The main goal of this paper is to argue that these interpretations cannot solve the problem of spurious causation. The Humean theory of causation is reduced only to the regular succession of events.
Keywords David Hume   Causation   Necessary connection   Traditional interpretation   Projectivism   Sceptical realism   Problem of spurious causes
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