Analysis 72 (1):57-60 (2012)

Thomas Kroedel
Universität Hamburg
The lottery paradox can be solved if epistemic justification is assumed to be a species of permissibility. Given this assumption, the starting point of the paradox can be formulated as the claim that, for each lottery ticket, I am permitted to believe that it will lose. This claim is ambiguous between two readings, depending on the scope of ‘permitted’. On one reading, the claim is false; on another, it is true, but, owing to the general failure of permissibility to agglomerate, does not generate the paradox. The solution generalizes to formulations of the paradox in terms of rational acceptability and doxastic rationality
Keywords Lottery paradox  Epistemic justification  Permissibility  Agglomeration  Rational belief  Rational acceptance  Lotteries
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DOI 10.1093/analys/anr129
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The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Two-State Solution to the Lottery Paradox.Artūrs Logins - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3465-3492.
The Composite Nature of Epistemic Justification.Paul Silva - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1).

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