Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (2):642–660 (2019)
AbstractThis article defends the view that liars need not intend to deceive. I present common objections to this view in detail and then propose a case of a liar who can lie but who cannot deceive in any relevant sense. I then modify this case to get a situation in which this person lies intending to tell his hearer the truth and he does this by way of getting the hearer to recognize his intention to tell the truth by lying. This case, and further cases that I develop from it, demonstrate that lying without the intention to deceive is possible.
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Citations of this work
Bald-Faced Lies, Blushing, and Noses that Grow: An Experimental Analysis.Vladimir Krstić & Alexander Wiegmann - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-24.