Lying, Tell-Tale Signs, and Intending to Deceive

Dialectica:1-27 (forthcoming)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Arguably, the existence of bald-faced (i.e. knowingly undisguised) lies entails that not all lies are intended to deceive. Two kinds of bald-faced lies exist in the literature: those based on some common knowledge that implies that you are lying and those that involve tell-tale signs (e.g. blushing) that show that you are lying. I designed the tell-tale sign bald-faced lies to avoid objections raised against the common knowledge bald-faced lies but I now see that they are more problematic than what I initially thought. Therefore, I will discuss these lies in more detail, refine the existing cases, and resolve some anticipated objections. I conclude that tell-tale sign bald-faced lies are genuine lies not intended to deceive.

Other Versions

edition Krstić, Vladimir (2023) "Lying: revisiting the ‘intending to deceive’ condition". Analysis 0():

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,934

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2022-07-22

Downloads
362 (#79,414)

6 months
40 (#108,732)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Vladimir Krstic
United Arab Emirates University

References found in this work

Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):105-116.
Assertion.Robert Stalnaker - 2013 - In Maite Ezcurdia & Robert J. Stainton (eds.), The Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary in Philosophy. Peterborough, CA: Broadview Press. pp. 179.
Common ground.Robert Stalnaker - 2002 - Linguistics and Philosophy 25 (5):701-721.
Assertion, knowledge, and context.Keith DeRose - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.

View all 45 references / Add more references