It’s common sense – you don’t need to believe to disagree!

Philosophical Psychology 38 (2):695-717 (2025)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

It is often assumed that disagreement only occurs when there is a clash (e.g., inconsistency) between beliefs. In the philosophical literature, this “narrow” view has sometimes been considered the obvious, intuitively correct view. In this paper, we argue that it should not be. We have conducted two preregistered studies gauging English speakers’ intuitions about whether there is disagreement in a case where the parties have non-clashing beliefs and clashing intentions. Our results suggest that common intuitions tell against the default view. Ordinary speakers describe clashes of intentions as disagreements, suggesting that the ordinary concept of disagreement is “wide” in that it extends beyond beliefs.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,667

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-04-14

Downloads
24 (#916,108)

6 months
16 (#192,948)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Miklos Kurthy
University of Sheffield (PhD)
Graham Bex-Priestley
University of Leeds
Yonatan Shemmer
University of Sheffield

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Ruling Passions.Simon Blackburn - 1998 - Philosophy 75 (293):454-458.
Thinking How to Live.Allan Gibbard - 2004 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 66 (2):381-381.
Relativism and disagreement.John MacFarlane - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (1):17-31.

View all 28 references / Add more references