Seeing mind in action

Abstract
Much recent work on empathy in philosophy of mind and cognitive science has been guided by the assumption that minds are composed of intracranial phenomena, perceptually inaccessible and thus unobservable to everyone but their owners. I challenge this claim. I defend the view that at least some mental states and processes—or at least some parts of some mental states and processes—are at times visible, capable of being directly perceived by others. I further argue that, despite its initial implausibility, this view receives robust support from several strands of empirical research.
Keywords Phenomenology  Philosophy of mind  Social cognition  Empathy  Distributed cognition  Extended mind
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DOI 10.1007/s11097-011-9226-y
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References found in this work BETA
Action in Perception.Alva Noë - 2005 - MIT Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Extended Emotions.Joel Krueger & Thomas Szanto - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (12):863-878.
Merleau-Ponty on Shared Emotions and the Joint Ownership Thesis.Joel Krueger - 2013 - Continental Philosophy Review 46 (4):509-531.
Varieties of Extended Emotions.Joel Krueger - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (4):533-555.

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