Seeing subjectivity: defending a perceptual account of other minds

ProtoSociology (47):239-262 (2012)
Abstract
The problem of other minds has a distinguished philosophical history stretching back more than two hundred years. Taken at face value, it is an epistemological question: it concerns how we can have knowledge of, or at least justified belief in, the existence of minds other than our own. In recent decades, philosophers, psychologists, neuroscientists, anthropologists and primatologists have debated a related question: how we actually go about attributing mental states to others (regardless of whether we ever achieve knowledge or rational justification in this domain). Until the mid-nineties, the latter debate – which sometimes goes under the name of the “mindreading” debate – was characterized by a fairly clear-cut opposition between two theoretical outlooks: “theory-theory” (TT) and “simulation theory” (ST). Theory-theorists typically argued that we attribute mental states to others on the basis of a “theory of mind” that is either constructed in early infancy and subsequently revised and modified (Gopnik 1996), or else is the result of maturation of innate mindreading “modules” (Baron-Cohen 1995).
Keywords Other Minds  Social Cognition  Emotions  Perception  Phenomenology
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On Direct Social Perception.Shannon Spaulding - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 36:472-482.
Seeing Mind in Action.Joel Krueger - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):149-173.
How Direct is Social Perception?John Michael & Leon De Bruin - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 36:373-375.
Framing a Phenomenological Interview: What, Why and How.Simon Høffding & Kristian Martiny - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (4):539-564.

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