Belief ascription and the Ramsey test

Synthese 190 (1):21-36 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this paper, I analyse a finding by Riggs and colleagues that there is a close connection between people’s ability to reason with counterfactual conditionals and their capacity to attribute false beliefs to others. The result indicates that both processes may be governed by one cognitive mechanism, though false belief attribution seems to be slightly more cognitively demanding. Given that the common denominator for both processes is suggested to be a form of the Ramsey test, I investigate whether Stalnaker’s semantic theory of conditionals, which was inspired by the Ramsey test, may provide the basis for a psychologically plausible model of belief ascription. The analysis I propose will shed some new light on the developmental discrepancy between counterfactual reasoning and false belief ascription.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,038

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

A defence of the Ramsey test.Richard Bradley - 2007 - Mind 116 (461):1-21.
Belief Revision, Non-Monotonic Reasoning, and the Ramsey Test.Charles B. Cross - 1990 - In Kyburg Henry E., Loui Ronald P. & Carlson Greg N. (eds.), Knowledge Representation and Defeasible Reasoning. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 223--244.
What does the False Belief test test?Marco Fenici - 2011 - Phenomenology and Mind 1:197-207.

Analytics

Added to PP
2012-08-09

Downloads
95 (#181,589)

6 months
7 (#432,182)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Karolina Krzyżanowska
University of Amsterdam

Citations of this work

A New Approach to Testimonial Conditionals.Stephan Hartmann & Ulrike Hahn - 2020 - In Stephan Hartmann & Ulrike Hahn (eds.), CogSci 2020 Proceedings. Toronto, Ontario, Kanada: pp. 981–986.
Conditionals.R. A. Briggs - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 543-590.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?David Premack & G. Woodruff - 1978 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (4):515-629.
Elusive knowledge.David Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
Causation.David Lewis - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (17):556-567.

View all 37 references / Add more references