Review of Metaphysics 25 (1):146-146 (1971)

Abstract
Despite the title, some of the essays are devoted to matters which are not strictly epistemological. Both Malcolm and Stoutland are concerned with accounting for the connection between intention and the object of intention. Malcolm reviews Wittgenstein's thoughts on the subject while Stoutland gives an account of intentions in terms of teleology. With an eye toward the free will and skepticism controversies, White attempts an account of "What Might Have Been," distinguishing between existential and problematic possibilities. The remaining essays delve into the topics of traditional epistemology. Oliver gives "A Sober Look at Solipsism" focussing attention on its 'causal' and 'privacy' postulates. Taking up the challenge of skepticism, Unger argues that "Our Knowledge of the Material World" not only is a reality, but is a function of our immediate experience. We can't help but believe such experiences, just as dogs must. The attempt is made by Pollock to map out "The Structure of Epistemic Justification" and he eschews a deductive model of explanation in favor of showing that logical reasons are but one kind of good reason--good reasons being the stuff of justification. Knox argues that "Do Appearances Exist?" deserves an affirmative answer as a consequence of the fact that we perceive objects, given his treatment of appearances as events. This is an interesting collection of essays, albeit for the non-subscriber, an expensive one.--K. T.
Keywords Catholic Tradition  Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 0034-6632
DOI revmetaph1971251196
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 58,518
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2012-03-18

Total views
16 ( #624,138 of 2,421,654 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #545,272 of 2,421,654 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes