Philosophical Psychology 19 (6):795-821 (2006)
According to the computational theory of mind , to think is to compute. But what is meant by the word 'compute'? The generally given answer is this: Every case of computing is a case of manipulating symbols, but not vice versa - a manipulation of symbols must be driven exclusively by the formal properties of those symbols if it is qualify as a computation. In this paper, I will present the following argument. Words like 'form' and 'formal' are ambiguous, as they can refer to form in either the syntactic or the morphological sense. CTM fails on each disambiguation, and the arguments for CTM immediately cease to be compelling once we register that ambiguity. The terms 'mechanical' and 'automatic' are comparably ambiguous. Once these ambiguities are exposed, it turns out that there is no possibility of mechanizing thought, even if we confine ourselves to domains where all problems can be settled through decision-procedures. The impossibility of mechanizing thought thus has nothing to do with recherché mathematical theorems, such as those proven by Gödel and Rosser. A related point is that CTM involves, and is guilty of reinforcing, a misunderstanding of the concept of an algorithm
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Themes From Kaplan.Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.) - 1989 - Oxford University Press, Usa.
Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science.Jerry A. Fodor - 1981 - MIT Press.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
The Mind Doesn't Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology.Josh Weisberg - manuscript
Fodor's Challenge to the Classical Computational Theory of Mind.Kirk Ludwig & Susan Schneider - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (1):123–143.
Logic and the Classical Theory of Mind.Peter Novak - 1998 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 27 (4):389-434.
Symbols and Computation: A Critique of the Computational Theory of Mind.Steven Horst - 1999 - Minds and Machines 9 (3):347-381.
Yes, It Does: A Diatribe on Jerry Fodor's the Mind Doesn't Work That Way.Susan Schneider - 2007 - Psyche.
Computational Explanation and Mechanistic Explanation of Mind.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2007 - In Francesco Ferretti, Massimo Marraffa & Mario De Caro (eds.), Synthese. Springer. pp. 343-353.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads296 ( #10,482 of 2,171,972 )
Recent downloads (6 months)39 ( #6,694 of 2,171,972 )
How can I increase my downloads?