Honor and Moral Revolution

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (1):147-59 (2016)

Authors
Victor Kumar
Boston University
Abstract
Western philosophers have generally neglected honor as a moral phenomenon worthy of serious study. Appiah’s recent work on honor in moral revolutions is an important exception, but even he is careful to separate honor from morality, regarding it as only “an ally” of morality. In this paper we take Appiah to be right about the psychological, social, and historical role honor has played in three notable moral revolutions, but wrong about the moral nature of honor. We defend two new theses: First, honor is an emotional and moral form of recognition respect that can hinder or aid moral progress. Second, honor, so conceived, can play a rational role in progressive moral change, as it did among the working class in the British abolition of slave trade, when the pressure of moral consistency moved them to protest American slavery as an affront to their honor without change in their moral belief that slavery is wrong
Keywords Honor  Respect  Morality  Moral judgment  Moral progress  Hybrid theory  Consistency reasoning
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Reprint years 2016
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DOI 10.1007/s10677-015-9593-5
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References found in this work BETA

The Emotional Construction of Morals.Jesse Prinz - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
Two Kinds of Respect.Stephen Darwall - 1977 - Ethics 88 (1):36-49.

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Citations of this work BETA

Moral Reasoning and Emotion.Joshua May & Victor Kumar - forthcoming - In Karen Jones, Mark Timmons & Aaron Zimmerman (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Moral Epistemology. Routledge. pp. 139-156.
Honor and Violence.John Thrasher & Toby Handfield - 2018 - Human Nature 29 (4):371-389.
The Empirical Identity of Moral Judgment: Table 1.Victor Kumar - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (265):783-804.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

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