Philosophical Studies 152 (1):135-54 (2010)
Intellectualist theories attempt to assimilate know how to propositional knowledge and, in so doing, fail to properly explain the close relation know how bears to action. I develop here an anti-intellectualist theory that is warranted, I argue, because it best accounts for the difference between know how and mere “armchair knowledge.” Know how is a mental state characterized by a certain world-to-mind direction of fit (though it is non-motivational) and attendant functional role. It is essential of know how, but not propositional knowledge, that it makes possible performance errors and has the functional role of guiding action. The theory is attractive, in part, because it allows for propositional, non-propositional and perhaps even non-representational varieties of know how.
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References found in this work BETA
A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science.Paul M. Churchland - 1989 - MIT Press.
Being There: Putting Brain, Body, and World Together Again.Andy Clark - 1997 - MIT Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Knowledge-How and Performance Success.Cheng-Chang Tu, Ming-Yuan Hsiao & Linton Wang - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (4):1157-1170.
Know-How as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account.David Löwenstein - 2017 - Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
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