Aristotle on essence and explanation

Philosophical Studies 31 (6):361 - 383 (1977)
Three claims about essential properties are frequently advanced in recent discussions: (1) a property belongs essentially to a thing only if that thing would cease to exist without that property, (2) an essential property is explanatory, And (3) an essential property is such that it must belong to everything to which it belongs. I argue that the "only if" in (1) cannot be changed to "if and only if" and (1) needs to be supplemented by (2), And that (2) is an indispensable feature of aristotle's view of essential properties and that it casts doubt on (3), Although (2) is usually assumed to provide a reason for (3)
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DOI 10.1007/BF01857029
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References found in this work BETA
Rationality and Believing the Impossible.Ruth Barcan Marcus - 1983 - Journal of Philosophy 80 (6):321-338.
Essentialism and Quantified Modal Logic.Terence Parsons - 1969 - Philosophical Review 78 (1):35-52.
Les États du Texte de Plotin. [REVIEW]Ralph Marcus - 1939 - Journal of Philosophy 36 (8):223-224.

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