Surveying Philosophers About Philosophical Intuition

Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (4):643-665 (2011)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper addresses the definition and the operational use of intuitions in philosophical methods in the form of a research study encompassing several regions of the globe, involving 282 philosophers from a wide array of academic backgrounds and areas of specialisation. The authors tested whether philosophers agree on the conceptual definition and the operational use of intuitions, and investigated whether specific demographic variables and philosophical specialisation influence how philosophers define and use intuitions. The results obtained point to a number of significant findings, including that philosophers distinguish between intuitions used to formulate (discovery) and to test (justification) philosophical theory. The survey results suggest that strategies implemented to characterise philosophical intuition are not well motivated since, even though philosophers do not agree on a single account of intuition, they fail to capture a preferred usage of intuitions as aspects of discovery. The quantitative summary of survey findings informs the debate on this topic, and advances more defined routes for subsequent approaches to the study of intuitions

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 74,509

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Surveying Philosophers: A Response to Kuntz & Kuntz.Wesley Buckwalter - 2012 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (4):515-524.
Intuitions as Intellectual Seemings.Berit Brogaard - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (4):382-393.
Who Needs Intuitions? Two Experimentalist Critiques.Jonathan Ichikawa - 2014 - In Anthony Robert Booth & Darrell P. Rowbottom (eds.), Intuitions. Oxford University Press. pp. 232-256.
Saving the Doxastic Account of Intuitions.Christian Nimtz - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (3):357-375.
The Evidential Status of Philosophical Intuition.Janet Levin - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 121 (3):193-224.
Gender and Philosophical Intuition.Wesley Buckwalter & Stephen Stich - 2013 - In Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Experimental Philosophy, Vol.2. Oxford University Press. pp. 307-346.
Philosophical Intuitions.Mark Fedyk - 2009 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 2 (2):54-80.
Explaining Away Intuitions.Jonathan Ichikawa - 2009 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 2 (2):94-116.
Intuitions and Relativity.Kirk Ludwig - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (4):427-445.
Evidence and Intuition.Yuri Cath - 2012 - Episteme 9 (4):311-328.

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-03-09

Downloads
278 (#41,754)

6 months
3 (#210,496)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

J. R. Kuntz
University of Edinburgh

Citations of this work

Intuition Fail: Philosophical Activity and the Limits of Expertise.Wesley Buckwalter - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):378-410.
Does the Method of Cases Rest on a Mistake?Moti Mizrahi - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (2):183-197.
On the Limitations and Criticism of Experimental Philosophy.Theodore Bach - forthcoming - In Alexander Max Bauer & Stephan Kornmesser (ed.), The Compact Compendium of Experimental Philosophy. Berlin and Boston:

View all 17 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

The Meaning of 'Meaning'.Hillary Putnam - 1975 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:131-193.
What Do Philosophers Believe?David Bourget & David J. Chalmers - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (3):465-500.

View all 49 references / Add more references