Dialectica 38 (2‐3):143-156 (1984)
SummaryStarting from examples of genuine perception and naive hallucination, different theories concerning the relation between the intentional and the real object are being discussed. It is shown that Meinong's theory is the most natural one, but it is argued against Meinong that the notion of “converse intentional property” should play a greater role
|Keywords||Intentionality Metaphysics Object Meinong|
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