Journal of Economic Methodology 17 (2):219–228 (2010)

Authors
Petri Ylikoski
University of Helsinki
Jaakko Kuorikoski
University of Helsinki
Abstract
Many of the arguments for neuroeconomics rely on mistaken assumptions about criteria of explanatory relevance across disciplinary boundaries and fail to distinguish between evidential and explanatory relevance. Building on recent philosophical work on mechanistic research programmes and the contrastive counterfactual theory of explanation, we argue that explaining an explanatory presupposition or providing a lower-level explanation does not necessarily constitute explanatory improvement. Neuroscientific findings have explanatory relevance only when they inform a causal and explanatory account of the psychology of human decision-making.
Keywords neuroeconomics  explanatory relevance  levels of explanation  interdisciplinarity  mechanisms
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DOI 10.1080/13501781003756576
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References found in this work BETA

Dissecting Explanatory Power.Petri Ylikoski & Jaakko Kuorikoski - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (2):201–219.

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Citations of this work BETA

For a Few Neurons More: Tractability and Neurally Informed Economic Modelling.Matteo Colombo - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (4):713-736.
Neuroeconomics: More Than Inspiration, Less Than Revolution.N. Emrah Aydinonat - 2010 - Journal of Economic Methodology 17 (2):159-169.

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