Philosophical Psychology 8 (4):341-351 (1995)

Abstract
Emotions normally include elements of feeling, motivation, and also intentionality; but the argument of this essay is that there can be emotion without feeling, emotion without corresponding motivation, and emotion without an intentional relation to an object such that the emotion is (among other things) a belief about or construal of it. Many recent writers have claimed that some form of intentionality is essential to emotion, and then have created lines of defence for this thesis. Thus, what look like troublesome cases of emotions can be regarded as having a global intentionality or as being “mood-like”. Alternatively surges of non-intentional joy or ecstasy can be regarded as merely feelings rather than as emotions, and what people experience in response to absolute music can be treated similarly. A clear view of how we normally talk about moods, emotions, and feelings however undermines these defences; and in particular we can understand the role of emotions in relation to absolute music once we become clear about the way in which musical content stands in for intentional objects.
Keywords Emotion  Feeling  Intentionality  Psychology  Science
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/09515089508573163
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 71,436
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Cognitivism in the Theory of Emotions.John Deigh - 1994 - Ethics 104 (4):824-54.

View all 16 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Jealousy in Relation to Envy.Luke Purshouse - 2004 - Erkenntnis 60 (2):179-205.
The Epistemology of Non-Instrumental Value.Joel J. Kupperman - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):659–680.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Emotions as Evaluative Feelings.Bennett W. Helm - 2009 - Emotion Review 1 (3):248--55.
Standing Up for an Affective Account of Emotion.Demian Whiting - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (3):261-276.
The Feeling Theory of Emotion and the Object-Directed Emotions.Demian Whiting - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 19 (2):281-303.
What Feelings Can't Do.Laura Sizer - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (1):108-135.
Affective Intentionality and the Feeling Body.Jan Slaby - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4):429-444.
Emotions, Feelings and Intentionality.Peter Goldie - 2002 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (3):235-254.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
69 ( #168,283 of 2,520,399 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #405,718 of 2,520,399 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes