Pluralism and the logical basis of metaphysics

In Logica Yearbook (2007)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I argue for a kind of logical pluralism on the basis of a difficulty with defining the meaning of negation in the framework of Dummett's and Prawitz' proof-theoretic semantics.

Other Versions

No versions found

Similar books and articles

How Fundamental is the Fundamental Assumption?Nils Kurbis - 2012 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):5-19.
Proof and Falsity: A Logical Investigation.Nils Kürbis - 2019 - Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Stable Harmony.Nils Kurbis - 2007 - In Michal Peliš (ed.), The Logica Yearbook 2007. Filosofia.
Revisiting Dummett's Proof-Theoretic Justification Procedures.Hermógenes Oliveira - 2017 - In Arazim Pavel & Lávička Tomáš (eds.), The Logica Yearbook 2016. College Publications. pp. 141-155.
Against Harmony.Ian Rumfitt - 1995 - In B. Hale & Crispin Wright (eds.), Blackwell Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Blackwell.
Inference Rules and the Meaning of the Logical Constants.Hermógenes Oliveira - 2019 - Dissertation, Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-07-26

Downloads
613 (#42,238)

6 months
68 (#84,497)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references