Reasoning about cooperation, actions and preferences

Synthese 169 (2):223 - 240 (2009)
In this paper, a logic for reasoning about coalitional power is developed which explicitly represents agents’ preferences and the actions by which the agents can achieve certain results. A complete axiomatization is given and its satisfiability problem is shown to be decidable and EXPTIME -hard.
Keywords Modal logic  Multi-agent systems  Collective agency
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-009-9551-7
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