Philosophical Studies 166 (1):45-64 (2013)

Charlie Kurth
Western Michigan University
A prominent argument for moral realism notes that we are inclined to accept realism in science because scientific inquiry supports a robust set of critical practices—error, improvement, explanation, and the like. It then argues that because morality displays a comparable set of critical practices, a claim to moral realism is just as warranted as a claim to scientific realism. But the argument is only as strong as its central analogy—and here there is trouble. If the analogy between the critical practices of science and morality is loosely interpreted, the argument does not support moral realism—for paradigmatically constructivist discourses like fashion display the relevant critical practices just as well. So if the argument is to have force, the realist must say more about why the critical practices of morality are sufficiently like those of science to warrant realism. But this cannot be done—moral inquiry differs from scientific inquiry in too many important ways. So the analogy with the critical practices of science fails to vindicate moral realism. But there are further lessons: in looking closely at the critical practices of our moral discourse—and in comparing them to the critical practices of science and fashion—we gain insight into what is distinctive about morality objectivity and moral metaphysics
Keywords Moral realism  Moral constructivism  Critical practices  Analogy argument  Moral objectivity
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-0020-7
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References found in this work BETA

Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Harvard University Press.
A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value.Sharon Street - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (1):109-166.
Moral Realism.Peter Railton - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (2):163-207.

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Citations of this work BETA

Cornell Realism, Explanation, and Natural Properties.Luis R. G. Oliveira & Timothy Perrine - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):1021-1038.
Expressivism and Innocent Mistakes.Charlie Kurth - 2014 - Ethics 124 (2):370-383.

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