Nils Kürbis
University of Lodz
The core idea of Davidson’s philosophy of language is that a theory of truth constructed as an empirical theory by a radical interpreter is a theory of meaning. I discuss an ambiguity that arises from Davidson's notion of interpretation: it can either be understood as the hypothetical process of constructing a theory of truth for a language or as a process that actually happens when speakers communicate. I argue that each disambiguation is problematic and does not result in a theory of meaning.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2014
DOI 10.1515/cpt-2014-0004
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 58,486
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Introduction.Donald Davidson - 2005 - In Truth and Predication. Harvard University Press. pp. 1-6.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Meaning and Truth.Greg Ray - 2014 - Mind 123 (489):79-100.
The Inconsistency of Deflationary Truth and Davidsonian Meaning.Kari Middleton - 2007 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:99-103.
What Davidson Should Have Said.Ernest LePore & Barry Loewer - 1989 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 36 (1):65-78.
Skepticism and Interpretation.Kirk Ludwig - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2):317-339.
Truth and Meaning.Robert C. Cummins - 2002 - In Joseph Keim-Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & David Shier (eds.), Meaning and Truth: Investigations in Philosophical Semantics. Seven Bridges Press. pp. 175-197.


Added to PP index

Total views
62 ( #163,551 of 2,421,440 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #544,098 of 2,421,440 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes