Martin Kusch
University of Vienna
_ Source: _Volume 6, Issue 2-3, pp 120 - 142 This paper aims to contribute to the debate over epistemic versus non-epistemic readings of the ‘hinges’ in Wittgenstein’s _On Certainty_. I follow Marie McGinn’s and Daniele Moyal-Sharrock’s lead in developing an analogy between mathematical sentences and certainties, and using the former as a model for the latter. However, I disagree with McGinn’s and Moyal-Sharrock’s interpretations concerning Wittgenstein’s views of both relata. I argue that mathematical sentences as well as certainties are true and are propositions; that some of them can be epistemically justified; that in some senses they are not prior to empirical knowledge; that they are not ineffable; and that their primary function is epistemic as much as it is semantic.
Keywords Daniele Moyal-Sharrock   Marie McGinn   Wittgenstein   mathematics   certainties
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DOI 10.1163/22105700-00603004
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References found in this work BETA

Philosophical Occasions, 1912-1951.Ludwig Wittgenstein (ed.) - 1993 - Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company.
Wittgensteinian Certainties.Crispin Wright - 2004 - In Denis McManus (ed.), Wittgenstein and Scepticism. Routledge. pp. 22--55.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Certainties of Delusion.Jakob Ohlhorst - 2021 - In Luca Moretti & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.), Non-Evidentialist Epistemology. Leiden: Brill. pp. 211-229.
Framing the Epistemic Schism of Statistical Mechanics.Javier Anta - 2021 - Proceedings of the X Conference of the Spanish Society of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science.

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