Oskari Kuusela
University of East Anglia
This paper outlines a solution to what can be called “the problem of domination by reason”, “conceptual domination” or “clarificatorory injustice”, connected with how a philosopher may appear to be in a position to legitimately coerce, by means of arguments, an interlocutor who shares with her a concept or a conceptual system to accept a philosophical characterization of a concept or whatever the concept concerns. The proposed solution is based on a particular interpretation of what Wittgenstein means by agreement in his later philosophy, when he says that philosophy only states what anyone grants to it. Wittgenstein’s view and the proposed solution are characterized by their continued recognition of the value of logic and reason, truth and knowledge, as opposed to attempting to solve the problem by embracing relativism and questioning the value of the logic, reason, truth and knowledge. Relevant kind of disagreements licence no relativistic conclusions, because problems relating to them can be solved without going this far. Keywords: domination, relativism, Wittgenstein, method, agreement.
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DOI 10.15845/nwr.v8i0.3505
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References found in this work BETA

Zettel.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1967 - Blackwell.
Sense and Sensibilia.J. L. Austin - 1962 - Oxford University Press USA.
Zettel.J. E. Llewelyn - 1968 - Philosophical Quarterly 18 (71):176-177.

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Two Forms of Domination by Reason.Matteo Falomi - 2019 - Nordic Wittgenstein Review 8.

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