A critique of Van Fraassen's voluntaristic epistemology

Synthese 98 (2):325-348 (1994)
Abstract
Van Fraassen's epistemology is forged from two commitments, one to a type of Bayesianism and the other to what he terms voluntarism. Van Fraassen holds that if one is going to follow a rule in belief-revision, it must be a Bayesian rule, but that one does not need to follow a rule in order to be rational. It is argued that van Fraassen's arguments for rejecting non-Bayesian rules is unsound, and that his voluntarism is subject to a fatal dilemma arising from the non-monotonic character of reasoning.
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DOI 10.1007/BF01063946
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References found in this work BETA
The Theory of Epistemic Rationality.Richard Foley - 1987 - Harvard University Press.
Clever Bookies and Coherent Beliefs.David Christensen - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (2):229-247.

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Citations of this work BETA
Van Fraassen's Critique of Inference to the Best Explanation.S. Okasha - 2000 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 31 (4):691-710.
Constructive Empiricism: Normative or Descriptive?Moti Mizrahi - 2014 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 22 (4):604-616.

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