Authors
Igal Kvart
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Abstract
Abstract In this paper I present a short outline of an Indicativity Theory of Knowledge, for the cases of Perceptual Knowledge and Knowledge by Memory. I explain the main rationale for a token-indicativity approach, and how it is fleshed out precisely in terms of chances. I elaborate on the account of the value of knowledge it provides, and what that value is. I explain why, given the rationale of conceiving Knowledge as token indicativity, separate sub-accounts in terms of chances should be extracted for the different modes of Knowledge, elaborating on the common core of high token-indicativity. In the main section that outlines the account of Perceptual Knowledge, the main Indicativity condition is presented, as are the main condition of in what sense high token indicativity should yields high chance, the important Discriminability condition, and its associated Contrast Class.
Keywords Knoweldge  Indicativity theory of Knowledge  chance-based Truth-Conditions for Knowledge Ascriptions  token indicativity  high token-indicativity  value of Knowledge  modes of Knowledge  Discriminability, Contrast Class  Perceptual Knowledge  Knowledge by Memory
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